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Gilbert makes a case against those who would downplay the importance of emotion
on the grounds that (a) both reason and emotion can become unbalanced (“out of
control”); (b) emotion is needed for good decision-making; and (c) the rejection of
emotion is deeply implicated within the practices of patriarchy.
In reading the paper for this response, I was most struck by the way that
disciplinary perspectives inform the problems that we see when we come to the
study of argumentation. Some established paradigm emerges in scholarship and
proclaims that “everything is X,” pressing everyone to pay attention to X. The next
move, of course, is to problematize that global claim, and demand attention to Y, as a
curious way of not being X.
Coming at argumentation studies from a discipline that tends to put
propositions (logic) and propositional attitudes (epistemology) at the center of
attention, Gilbert in opposition sees the problem as one of carving out space for
curiously non-propositional materials like emotions.
By contrast, the disciplinary tradition of rhetoric puts civic deliberations at
the center of attention. Within what Kenneth Burke termed the Barnyard of our civic
life, emotions and their close cousins moods, desires, passions, interests,
preferences, motives, perspectives, climates of opinion and worldviews obviously
reign supreme. They are, to use Gilbert’s word, “permeative.” As the early American
orator Fisher Ames proclaimed, “the only constant agents in political affairs are the
passions of men.” Thus the original studiers of civic deliberations wrote treatises of
rhetoric focused just on appeals to emotion (Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.1). So when those
of us from rhetorical and allied communication fields come to the study of
argumentation, we often see the problem as one of carving room out of all this
emotion-stuff for the curious activity of giving good reasons.
Aristotle’s own treatise of rhetoric focused largely on the possibilities of
logos (as well as aiming to establish ethos as a distinct form of rhetorical appeal, not
just a mild sort of pathos, Fortenbaugh, 1992). In contemporary argumentation
studies, Scott Jacobs has adopted a similar approach. According to his seminal
“Rhetoric and Dialectic from the Standpoint of Normative Pragmatics” (2000), the
study of argumentation must attend to “the contingencies, possibilities and limits of
actual situations” characterized by “limited information, imagination and time,
questionable motive, vested interest, complex social arrangements, and so forth” (p.
274)—a list that Jacobs would undoubtedly be willing to extend to include
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emotions. One key task of argumentation theory is to explain how these possibly
good-reason-unfriendly “actual situations” can be reconstructed by the arguers in
order put themselves “in a position to decide if claims should be reasonably
accepted or rejected” (p. 274). We need to find out how argumentative discourse
manages “to encourage mutual, voluntary, free, comprehensive, open, fair, impartial,
considered, reasoned, informed, reflective, and involved engagement” (p. 274) even
within the cacophonous Barnyard.
The essays which have been filling out this normative pragmatic program for
argumentation studies do not aim to show how reason can overcome emotion.
Rather, the focus is on how argumentative discourse can create a situation in which
a normatively appropriate complex of reasons and emotions (and other features)
prevails. There are several possibilities worth considering.
On one hand, emotional appeals can create circumstances in which an giving
good reasons can begin to be productive. Jacobs himself goes on to analyze a quite
strident emotional appeal, and concludes that “here and in many other
controversies emotional appeals can play a constructive role in deliberation and
may be positively required by the situation” (p. 277). He explains:
Among other situations, there are those where an audience does not take seriously
the urgency or moral gravity of the problems addressed by an advocate but they
should. Under these circumstances effective emotional appeals may not degrade the
deliberative capacities of an audience; they may enhance them. Likewise,
expressions of incredulity and moral outrage may be practical necessities just to be
able to re-open what much of the public takes to be an already decided issue and
just to lay claim to having a legitimate standpoint in the first place” (p. 277).

On the other hand, giving good reasons can be a necessary component of a
legitimate appeal to emotion. Beth Innocenti has explored how this works in a series
of useful articles. In her account (2011), an appeal to fear encourages action by
creating a situation in which auditors may be criticized for inattention and lack of
public spirit if they do not respond quickly and appropriately to a speaker’s dire
warnings. At the same time, however, in making a fear appeal the speaker is putting
her own public standing at risk; she has to defend her right to arouse the auditors’
emotions by offering good arguments for the impending threat. Appeals to shame
have a similar structure (2007); a speaker can help her audience see that their
behaviour is rightfully characterized as shameful, but only at the cost of undertaking
to support that charge with good reasons.
Central to all this work is a basic understanding that the giving of good
reasons is an important enough activity to deserve distinguishing from all the other
activities that are happening in argumentative discourse. We even bite the bullet
and call a good reason that gets given by its ordinary name, argument. Jacobs (2000)
urges us to accept a characterization of arguments as
fundamentally linguistic entities that express with a special pragmatic force
propositions, where those propositions stand in particular inferential relations to
one another. If you cannot explicate from a message such propositional assemblies
and modes of expression, the message is not an argument. (p. 264)
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Or to put it in simpler and traditional terms, an argument has been made when
some discourse openly displays a premise/conclusion structure—a reason. Why is it
worth characterizing arguments this narrowly? Because, as Jacobs (2000) explains,
“arguments have some distinctive properties—properties that are crucial to their
privileged status as modes of gaining warranted assent, reasoned adherence,
voluntary and informed acceptance” (p. 264). And in addition to warranting assent,
good reasons give us the tools to critique unexamined, unstated or actively occluded
assumptions; they allow us to gain increased clarity about what we are talking
about; they grant legitimacy to claims that might otherwise be dismissed; and they
are uttered in the enduring (however counterfactual) hope that others—everyone—
will eventually see reason.
So, speaking from the normative pragmatic perspective, Gilbert’s call for
students of argumentation to attend to more cognitive/affective attitudes than just
belief is welcome (see Pinto 2009, 2010). Also welcome is his insistence on
examining arguments in their full contexts, including the context of the emotional
states from which they are spoken and in which they are heard (see Jacobs 1999,
quoting Austin: “the total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual
phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating”). But a goal of
“reintegrating emotion and reason,” or establishing “emotional argument;” that we
find less compelling. It is precisely the fact that “emotion is permeative” which
renders so curious the small but unique contributions that giving good reasons
makes to our civic life.
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